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Abstract
The concept of 'employment' appears in various contexts in English 
law. However, the word 'employment' is defined in a variety of ways 
depending on which context is in point. This gives rise to the question 
as to whether there is a single, unified, concept of employment that 
is  nevertheless characterised  differently  according  to  context,  or 
whether  a  common  term is  used  to  cover  a  variety of  differing 
concepts. The issue is an important one because the requirement or 
legitimacy of adopting cross-contextual, comparative, approaches is 
relevant  to  the  development  and  interpretation of  employment-
related matters in several areas of law.
Introduction
This article consists of a comparative analysis of uses of the 
term  'employment'  in  English  law.  Its  aim is  not  simply  to  draw 
comparisons in usage between the numerous and diverse legal areas 
in  which  the  concept  is  of  relevance,  but  to  address  some 
straightforward, yet fundamental and perplexing, issues concerning 
the cross-disciplinary usage of the term. 
It might be thought that the term 'employment' in law connotes 
a  single, unified, concept applicable across a  wide range of  legal 
contexts. On this view, for example, someone who seeks to establish 
that they have been unfairly dismissed (for which, in order to obtain 
legal redress, they must establish that they have employment status) 
would be identifiable as an employee also in the field of, say, anti-
discrimination  legislation.  Given the  width  of  varied definitions of 
employment in different legal contexts, this may appear a difficult 
position to maintain. But that is not so obvious as it would initially 
appear.  Perhaps  differing  definitions  should  be  seen  as  merely 
restricting the types of employees who are given legal protection or 
liabilities as the case may be. Or, perhaps more acceptably, differing 
definitions  should  perhaps  be  viewed  as  the  consequence  of 
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alternative perspectives, from varied standpoints, of a single, unified, 
concept. So the matter  has to be addressed as to why there are 
differing  definitions  in  different  contexts  if  a  unified  concept  of 
employment is utilised. One explanation could be that it is due to 
evolving  understanding  of  the  concept.  Another  is  that  policy 
considerations are the cause.
Of interest here is the approach of the courts themselves. To 
what extent do they seem to be of the opinion that the concept of 
employment is, or should be, treated in a uniform manner? This, of 
course,  is  a  complex  question  in  that it  is  not a  matter  that the 
judiciary is able to examine in a disinterested way, for the correct 
analysis  is  partly  determined  by  their  own  approaches  to  the 
question.
An alternative view to the unified approach just described is 
that the word 'employment' refers to different concepts for which a 
single term is utilised in differing legal contexts. If this is so, then 
further issues arise as to why the common term is utilised. This would 
raise the possibility that the use of the word 'employment' is merely a 
type of  legal  shorthand denoting  the subject matter of  particular 
types of work-related legal liabilities and entitlements. It would thus 
nevertheless  have  at  least  some  sort  of  underlying  connective 
feature.  Or  perhaps  there  is  some  other  explanation.  Whatever 
conclusion is reached on this, the further issue is raised concerning 
the extent to which, if at all, different terms should be adopted in 
different  contexts  in  order  to  delineate  clearly  their  nature  and 
function. This might have the, what might be thought to be beneficial, 
consequence of removing the temptation on the judiciary to examine 
concepts in particular discrete areas of law which are inappropriate in 
another  context  merely  because  of  the  adoption  of  a  common 
terminology. 
Whatever the  answers are  to  these perplexities,  the further 
consideration arises as to whether it is necessary, desirable and/or 
possible to alter our usage of the word in the light of the conclusions 
reached on these prior questions.
Let us now examine these issues in greater depth.
Current Usage
The  legal  contexts  in  which  the  word  'employment'  is  used  are 
various in nature. Most obviously, it is used in employment law to 
connote  those  who  are  entitled  under  statute  to  employment 
protection rights such as those in unfair dismissal and redundancy 
law, as well as to rights to a written statement as to particulars of 
employment, to an itemised pay statement, not to have unauthorised 
deductions from wages made by the employer, guarantee payments 
on not being provided with work and so on.1 It is also necessary to 
1I am most grateful to Professor Andrew Tettenborn and John Bowers QC for reading 
a draft of this article.
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identify  those who  are  under  the  correlative liabilities.2 The term 
'employment' is  used at  common law to  indicate the  nature  and 
extent  of  obligations under  different  types  of  work-contracts, for 
example by the incorporation of different types of implied terms.3 In 
the  law of  tort it  is  used primarily in  the  context  of  establishing 
whether there is vicarious liability on the part of one party for the 
torts committed by those who work for him or her.4 In revenue law, 
'employment' denotes, for example, those who are liable to particular 
income tax liabilities.5 In public law it is relevant in, for example, the 
context of establishing rights to natural justice.6
 See primarily the Employment Rights Act 1996.
2 It is becoming increasingly important to identify 'employment', not to establish 
who are  employees -  the  traditional  concern  -  but  who are  employers.  This  is 
particularly  the  case  because  of  the  growing  fragmentation  of  types  of  work 
relationships with the growth of employment agencies, personal service contracts 
and so on. In these cases the person for whom the employee is working is not 
necessarily  that  person's  employer.  See  Deakin,  'The  Changing Concept  of  the 
"Employer" in Labour Law',  (2001) 30 ILJ  72. However,  there are signs that the 
courts are beginning to be prepared to take a radical approach, and determine that, 
regardless  of  classical  theory,  an  employment  relationship  may  exist  between 
parties between whom there is no direct express contractual nexus. In  Dacas v. 
Brook Street Bureau (UK) Ltd  [2004] IRLR 358 an employment agency appealed 
against a decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, overturning the employment 
tribunal, to the effect that the defendant was employed by the employment agency. 
The Court of Appeal allowed the agency's appeal on the basis that the tests of 
employment,  such  as  the  requirement  for  a  necessary  degree  of  mutuality  of 
obligation,  had  not  been  established.  There  was  no  cross-appeal  against  the 
tribunal's decision that the end-user - the Council for whom the defendant worked - 
was not the defendant's employer either, and so the Court of Appeal was not in a 
position to find that it was. However, two of their lordships, Mummery and Sedley 
LJJ gave strong indications that they would have held the end-user to have been the 
defendant's employer, even though there was no express contractual relationship 
between them. The possibility existed that the contract could have been implied. In 
the present context it is interesting to note (for reasons which will become clear 
below) that not only was the identification of any employer the primary issue here, 
but that the Court of Appeal assumed that a finding that the defendant was not 
employed for  the purposes of  her unfair  dismissal  claim entailed the idea that 
neither the employment agency nor the Council would have been vicariously liable 
for any torts she may have committed i.e. that the unified approach pertained - see 
the judgment of Mummery LJ at para.2. 
3 So, for example, if a contract is found to be a contract of service, there will be 
implied terms of co-operation (Secretary of State for Employment v. ASLEF (No.2) 
[1972]  ICR  19),  obedience  (Ottoman  Bank  v.  Chakarian [1930]  AC  277), 
confidentiality (Faccenda Chicken v. Fowler  [1986] IRLR 69) and mutual trust and 
confidence (Malik v.  Bank of Credit and Commerce International  [1997] IRLR 462) 
that are not to be found implied in contracts for services. Thus the contract and the 
relationship are not characterised by virtue of the content of the contract, but the 
content  of  the  contract  is  determined,  at  least  in  part,  by  the  nature  of  the 
relationship.
4 See e.g. Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 16th edn 2002 
by W.V.H. Rogers) ch. 20.
5 See e.g. Tiley, Revenue Law, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 4th edn 2000) p.201f.
6 See e.g. Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
9th edn 2004) p.539f.
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Arguments for the 'unified' analysis
It might be thought that the use of the word 'employment' in each of 
these different areas of law clearly cannot refer to the same concept 
(a 'unified' concept) in that the definition (or at least the method of 
identification) of employment may be different in each. This would 
seem particularly to be the case in statute law where a specified 
definition is laid down in each instance. Often these definitions vary, 
and perhaps even within the same area of law. So, for example, the 
definition  for  the  purposes  of  unfair  dismissal  and  redundancy 
protection is different from that used for sex discrimination law.7
However, it does not necessarily follow, although it might be 
the case that different definitions exist because different concepts are 
being defined. It is quite possible, of course, for a concept (or thing, 
or  word)  to  be  defined  in  different  ways  purely  because  of  the 
standpoint of the person making the definition, or because of differing 
purposes  of  a  definition.  A  car,  for  example,  might  be  defined 
differently  for  the  purposes of  a  general  dictionary  than  for  the 
purposes of historians of travel, insurance companies or the Inland 
Revenue. The difficulty with that in the present context, however, it is 
not merely that different wording is used in differing contexts, but 
that the employees who are covered by a particular definition differ in 
each instance. Sometimes a definition can be wider, or narrower, than 
others. This is strong evidence against the argument of perspective.
There would seem to be two further clear competing candidate 
reasons why there are different definitions in different statutes. The 
first is that there may have been a change in understanding of the 
concept.  Inadequacies  in  previous  legislation  might  have  been 
identified and thus the opportunity has been taken to take remedial 
action. So, the definition of employment in the Sex Discrimination Act 
of 1975 is therefore somewhat wider than that in the Employment 
Rights Act 1996. However, that is not at all a convincing explanation. 
The definition under the 1996 Act is actually originally to be found in 
earlier legislation8 pre-dating the Act of 1975, and yet it has been re-
adopted. If it were thought to be inferior to the 1975 definition one 
would expect it to have been altered when the opportunity presented 
itself.
The other candidate explanation is that different definitions are 
used in legislation seeking to achieve different objectives because of 
policy  considerations. For  example,  it  might  be  thought  that  the 
category  of  those  at  work  entitled  to  protection  from  sex 
discrimination  is  wider  than  those  who  should  be  entitled  to 
protection against unfair dismissal or redundancy. This seems to be a 
7 Section 230(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, giving unfair dismissal and 
redundancy  protection  rights,  defines  an  employee  as  'an  individual  who  has 
entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) 
a contract of employment.' However, section 82(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975 refers to 'employment under a contract of service or of apprenticeship or a 
contract personally to execute any work or labour.' It is thus somewhat wider.
8 Industrial Relations Act 1971 s. 167(1).
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much  more  attractive  explanation.  For  example,  if  government 
ministers state that they have not decided whether particular groups 
of  workers are  employees for  the  purposes  of  particular  items of 
employment  legislation,9 they are  not  uncertain  as  to  whether  it 
would  be lexicographically  correct  to  use the term.  They are  not 
challenged as to the meaning of the word but are uncertain on policy 
grounds whether to bring certain types of people within the scope of 
legal protection. In this way, the term 'employee' may be seen merely 
as a familiar shorthand word to be used in these type of situations to 
denote those who have the rights or liabilities in question. It is not 
surprising, then, that the definition is different in different contexts.
The approach of the courts to a 'unified' analysis
The approach of the courts seems, at first blush, to have been 
consistently  one  of  adopting  the  'unified'  analysis.10 One  factor 
suggesting that is that the tests in employment law are also those 
that have been employed in tort and tax cases, for example.11 The 
oldest test, which is retained as an element in later tests, was that of 
control.  The greater the degree of control  over the worker by the 
other party, the greater the likelihood that the relationship would be 
considered to be one of master and servant.12 The leading case in the 
nineteenth century was Yewens v. Noakes,13 a decision of the Court of 
Appeal concerning the issue whether or not 'habitable house duty' 
was  payable.  Bramwell  LJ  famously  said:  "A  servant  is  a  person 
subject to the command of his master as to the manner in which he 
shall do his work."14 Most obviously, perhaps, the element of control is 
applicable in tort cases, especially with regard to vicarious liability 
when it would seem clear that the test should be whether liability 
should  attach  to  someone who  controlled  the  negligent  acts  of 
another.15 The test was also current in employment law for a long 
time,  and  is  still  considered  to  be  an  important element to  be 
considered  in  more  sophisticated  tests.  So,  for  example,  in 
9 As, for example, they are empowered to do with regard to trainees by virtue of 
section 26 of the Employment Act 1988. See further Honeyball,  A Guide to the 
Employment Act 1988 (London, Butterworths, 1988) ch. 17.
10 Some academic writers also seem to assume that a unified approach is the more 
preferable - see e.g. Deakin, 'The Changing Concept of the "Employer" in Labour 
Law', (2001) 30 ILJ 72, at p. 72. 
11 See  McKendrick  'Vicarious  Liability  and  Independent  Contractors  -  A  Re-
examination'  (1990) 53 MLR 770 at  p.  782-784 where the author  states,  in  an 
argument that accepts the existence of the unified approach of the common law, 
that a contextual approach was urgently required for the purposes of the law on 
vicarious liability.
12 The terms 'employee' and 'servant' are often considered to be synonyms, but 
Markesinis  and Deakin state that this  is wrong of  the nineteenth century -  see 
Markesinis and Deakin, Tort Law, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 5th edn 2003) at p. 574. 
13 (1880) 6 QBD 530.
14 Ibid., p.532.
15 See e.g. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins and Griffiths Ltd [1947] AC 
1 and Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council [1947] KB 598.
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Montgomery v. Johnson Underwood Ltd  16 the Court of Appeal held 
that, in the context of an unfair dismissal claim, control together with 
mutuality of obligations was an irreducible minimum in establishing 
an employment relationship. Control also plays an important part in 
the multiple test, as we shall shortly see, dating from the decision of 
the  High  Court  in  Ready  Mixed  Concrete17 in  1968,  expressly 
approved recently by the House of Lords in  Carmichael v. National 
Power plc.18
Various factors contributed to the demise of the control test as 
a single-factor test, although it is doubtful that the traditional reason 
given - that it was due to the growing technical nature of much of 
employment  duties  over  which  an  employer  could  have  no  real 
control due to insufficient knowledge and expertise -  is unlikely to 
paint the entire picture.  That was true of much of the nineteenth 
century  also.  Nevertheless,  it  was  considered  to  be  increasingly 
inadequate  and  was  replaced  by  a  number  of  other  judicial 
approaches.  The  so-called  integration  (or  organisational)  test  was 
explored in the early 1950s whereby the extent to which the worker 
was assimilated into the business was considered to  be the best 
determinant. This test too found its way into a variety of areas of law. 
It  was  particularly  developed  in  the  employment  law  case  of 
Stevenson Jordan and Harrison Ltd v. MacDonald and Evans19 when 
the Court of Appeal had to consider an issue of the law of breach of 
confidence. Denning LJ described the test in these terms: 
… under a contract of service, a man is employed as part of the 
business,  and  his  work  is  done  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
business,  whereas,  under  a  contract  for  services, his  work, 
although done for the business, is not integrated into it but is 
only accessory to it.20
The test was also used in tort cases, such as the decision of the Court 
of Appeal in the negligence case of Cassidy v. Minister of Health21 as 
well as tax cases such as  Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v. 
Slatford22 when Lord Denning put it this way: "[employment status] 
depends  on  whether  the  person  is  part  and  parcel  of  the 
organisation."23
Later still  came the economic reality test which involved the 
courts looking primarily at the extent to which the employee's work 
and personal circumstances reflected someone who was in business 
16 [2001] IRLR 269.
17 Ready Mixed Concrete v. (South East Ltd) v. Minister of Pensions and National 
Insurance [1968] 2 QB 497.
18 [2000] IRLR 43.
19 [1952] 1 TLR 101. This case also gave rise to issues in copyright law.
20 Ibid., p.111.
21 [1951] 1 All ER 574. It was because of this case that the demise of the control 
test to be replaced by the integration test was predicted by Sir Otto Kahn-Freund in 
his casenote at (1951) 14 MLR 504. This proved to be greatly exaggerated.
22 [1953] 1 QB 248.
23 Ibid., p. 295.
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on his own account. If that was the case then the contract was a 
contract for  services,  but  if  it  was  not  then  the  contract  was  a 
contract  of  service. This  was  first  enunciated  in  the  High  Court 
decision in Market Investigations Ltd v. Minister of Social Security24 in 
1969.  This  was  a  case  deciding  an  issue  relating  to  National 
Insurance.25 But, again, the test was utilised in other areas of the law. 
In Young and Woods Ltd v. West,26 for example,  the Court of Appeal 
applied it in a case concerning unfair dismissal. It was applied in a 
decision on liability for compensation for injury in the Privy Council 
case of  Lee v. Chung and Shun Shing Construction and Engineering 
Co. Ltd27 in 1990.
More recently,  the courts have not looked for  any particular 
identifying characteristic of employment but rather have adopted a 
Wittgensteinian multiple approach which is more concerned with an 
exercise  which  balances  factors  on  the  one  hand  indicating 
employment and on the other those that do not.28 This is the so-called 
multiple  test.  In  Ready Mixed Concrete29 this  was given a  three-
pronged formulation. First, the employee agrees that in consideration 
of a wage or other remuneration he will provide his own his own work 
and  skill  for  the  employer.  Secondly  the  employee  expressly  or 
impliedly agrees that he will  be subject to the employer's control. 
Thirdly, the other provisions of the contract have to be consistent 
with a contract of employment. This can be broken down into a great 
number of relevant considerations such as the extent to which the 
employee provides his own tools or clothing, the extent to which he is 
free to do the work at  a  time of  his  own choosing,  or  where he 
chooses to do so, the manner in which it is done, the extent to which 
he can sub-contract, if at all, the work to other workers, whether he 
bears any financial risk, insurance responsibilities and so on. No one 
factor is determinative but each is placed on the theoretical scales 
which  will  dip  one  side  or  another.  If  this  does  not  happen the 
description  of  the  relationship  made  by  the  parties  could  be 
considered relevant.30 
The Ready Mixed case was one to do with National Insurance 
liabilities. But,  the important point here is  that, as with the other 
tests, this test has also been applied in other areas of the law. So, in 
Hall (Inspector of Taxes) v. Lorimer31 the Court of Appeal applied it in 
a  case concerning liability  for  income tax. It  has been applied in 
24 [1969] 2 QB 173.
25 On a similar point see Withers v. Flackwell Heath Football Supporters' Club [1981] 
IRLR 307.
26 [1980] IRLR 201.
27 [1990] IRLR 236.
28 See e.g. Nethermere (St Neots) Ltd. v. Taverna & Gardiner [1984] ICR 612, [1984] 
IRLR 240.
29 Supra n.17.
30 Davis v. New England College of Arundel [1977] ICR 6.
31 [1994] IRLR 171.
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negligence cases, such as Lane v. Shire Roofing Co. (Oxford) Ltd32 as 
well as, of course, to employment law situations.33
There are also indications that the courts view the concept of 
employment as unified, not just because they apply the same tests in 
different contexts, but also because, in general,  they do not allow 
different definitions in the same situation. Take, for example, Massey 
v. Crown Life Assurance Co.34 where the Court of Appeal would not 
allow  a  man  who  had  been  classified  as  self-employed  for  the 
purposes of his status for income tax purposes to be classified as 
employed for the purposes of claiming unfair dismissal. In the later 
case of Young and Woods Ltd v. West35 the Court of Appeal did allow a 
re-classification, but it still did not countenance different classification 
in  each  case.  It  felt  that  the  Inland  Revenue  should  re-coup  the 
advantage the employee had received by way of  the earlier  mis-
classification. 
In  Calder v. H. Kitson Vickers Ltd36 Ralph Gibson LJ was clear, 
without  argument,  that  the  unified  theory  was  correct.  He  said, 
referring to the issue as to whether a worker was an employee:
… the decision  does not depend upon the circumstances in 
which  the  question  is  raised,  that  is  to  say,  for  example, 
whether it is a claim for damages for personal injury or an issue 
as to the obligation to deduct National Insurance contributions.
In  the  Employment  Appeal  Tribunal  (EAT)  case  of  Hilton 
International Hotels (UK) Ltd. v. Protopapa,37 the employee claimed 
that she was constructively dismissed by her employer because her 
employment was in  fact  terminated by  her  superior who had no 
authority to do so. Knox J stated that the EAT saw no reason to draw 
the line in any other place than that applied by the general law of 
vicarious  liability  of  the  employer,  even  though  this  was  in  the 
context  of  a  statutory  claim for  unfair  dismissal in  circumstances 
where vicarious liability would never be an issue. 
However,  sometimes  the  courts  are  prepared  to  accept 
different classifications in the same situation. For example, in Hewlett 
Packard Ltd v. O'Murphy38 the EAT held that, even though a claimant 
had been characterised as an employee for tax purposes, it was right 
not  to  classify  him  as  such  for  unfair  dismissal  purposes. 
Nevertheless, it did not consider, nor does it seem it was invited to 
consider, the implications of differing characterisations of one status 
in different areas of law. In Airfix Footwear Ltd. v. Cope39 the EAT held 
32 [1995] IRLR 493.
33 For recent examples of many see  Express and Echo Publications Ltd v. Tanton 
[1999] IRLR 367 and the House of Lords' decision in Carmichael v. National Power 
plc [2000] IRLR 43.
34 [1978] 2 All ER 576, [1978] 1 WLR 676.
35 [1980] IRLR 201.
36 [1988] ICR 232 at p.254.
37 [1990] IRLR 316.
38 [2002] IRLR 4.
39 [1978] ICR 1210.
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that someone was an employee for the purposes of unfair dismissal 
protection even though he was treated as an independent contractor 
for tax purposes. Likewise, in  Wardell v.  Kent County Council40 the 
Court  of  Appeal stated that a  person could  be a  servant for  the 
purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1925 even though they 
were  not  for  the  purposes  of  the  law  of  negligence.41 A  similar 
decision was reached by the Court of Appeal again in  Denham v. 
Midland Employers Mutual Assurance Ltd.42 
Difficulties with the 'unified' analysis
There  are  certainly  difficulties  associated  with  the  unified 
approach, not least on the grounds of public policy. Some writers have 
suggested that the reason why the control test came to be seen as 
unsatisfactory as the single determinant of employment status was 
that  many  relationships  the  courts  wanted to  recognise  as  such 
simply  did  not  have  the  necessary  degree  of  control.  Modified 
analyses, attempting to retain the pivotal role of control - such as the 
idea that, even if there were not actual control of the worker in his or 
her tasks, the residual capacity of the other party to exert that control 
if  he or  she so desired was enough -  did  not  work either.  Some 
employers clearly did not have this expertise. It was not that they 
chose not to exercise it. The element of control was missing. It is thus 
thought by these writers that the move to other tests was brought 
about  by  changing  social  factors  together with changing  ways in 
which  work was done,  and  the  evolving  nature  of  that  work.  As 
Markesinis and Deakin put it:
The control test was more appropriate to the social conditions 
of an earlier age ….. As specialist skills of employees increased, 
the unskilled employer was less and less able to control their 
work….. The increasing subtlety of the employment relationship 
makes the control test, however modified, inadequate. 43
40 [1938] 2 KB 768.
41 Greer LJ (dissenting) made the different but related point that it is possible to be a 
servant for some of the tasks involved in a position whilst being an independent 
contractor for others. So, a nurse in performing nursing duties was not, he thought, 
a servant, but whilst performing administrative duties, she was. (See too Hillyer v 
Governors  of  St.  Bartholomew's  Hospital  [1909] 2 KB 820.)  Whilst  the  majority 
disagreed  with  Greer  LJ  on  the  facts,  they  did  not  question  the  logic  of  his 
argument. The court does not appear to have given any thought to the daunting 
complications  this  gave  rise  to  regarding  the  employee's  tax  status.  See  too 
Goodhart, (1938) 54 LQR 553 and Grunfeld, (1954) 17 MLR 547.
42 [1955] 2 QB 437.
43 Ibid.  Furthermore, as Markesinis and Deakin also point out, the move to a test 
that requires an examination of the issue, not as to whether there is control, but if 
there is a  right to so control, presupposes that the relationship has already been 
characterised as an employment relationship - see Markesinis and Deakin, Tort Law, 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 5th edn 2003) at p. 574. 
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However,  this  is  not  an  entirely  satisfactory analysis.  What 
makes the control test increasingly inapplicable, at least for a unified 
concept of employment, is  that it  is  not based upon sound policy 
grounds when taken away from the area of  vicarious liability  and 
utilised elsewhere. To extend vicarious liability to A (an employer) 
where  B  (an  employee)  does a  negligent  act  would  seem to  be 
justified if there is a sufficient degree of control by A over B, at least 
while B does the act over which A has control. In effect, the person 
really committing the tort is the employer. The employee to all intents 
and purposes is the tool, or the medium, by which the negligent act is 
brought about. As Lord Chelmsford L.C. put it in Bartonshill Coal Co. v. 
McGuire:44
… every act which is done by a servant in the course of his duty 
is regarded as done by his master's orders, and consequently is 
the same as if it were the master's own act.
On the other hand, it is not at all  clear why the element of 
control should be considered to be important in determining whether 
there should be statutory liability for the manner in which a working 
relationship is brought to an end, or for acts which are, for example, 
sexually  discriminatory.  Different policy considerations surely  there 
come into play and a contextual approach seems necessarily more 
appropriate. 
It is the control test where, perhaps most clearly, it can be seen 
that  the courts  have never in  fact been primarily  concerned with 
seeking a definition of employment that is based on lexicographical 
considerations. Even in the nineteenth century it would seem that, far 
from  discovering  that  control  was  the  determining  factor  in  the 
characterisation  of  the  employment  relationship,  its  place  was 
secured more because of the desire of Victorian judges to re-assert 
the master's right to control his servant.45 The element of control was 
thus injected into the relationship, not determinative of it.
Atiyah felt able to state in 1967, in an argument that supports the 
unified thesis, that  Parliament approaches legislation in  a  manner 
consistent with it. He sought to illustrate that by showing that the 
phrase  'contract  of  service'  appeared  in  legislation,  as  it  not 
infrequently  did,  without  definition.  He  said:  "it  is  a  reasonable 
assumption that it intends to attract the existing body of law on the 
subject",46 that is to say, the whole body of case law on the matter, 
whatever the context. However, even if that were true then, it would 
not  appear to  be  true  today.  It  is  still  the  case  that  Parliament 
continues  to  use  the  phrase  'contract of  service'  without  further 
definition,  such  as  in  section  2  of  the  Employment  Act  2002 
concerning rights to statutory paternity pay and statutory adoption 
pay.  However,  the  phrase  generally  tends  to  appear  within  a 
44 (1858) 3 Macq. 300 at p. 306.
45 See Wedderburn, Lewis and Clark, Labour Law and Industrial Relations (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1983) at p. 147.
46 Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (Butterworths, London, 1967) p. 32.
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definition  of employment, and these are quite varied. So,  to take 
some recent examples, in section 42(5) of the Sexual Offences Act 
2003, 'employment' means any employment, whether paid or unpaid 
and whether under a  contract of service or apprenticeship, under a 
contract for services, or otherwise than under a contract. This can be 
contrasted with section 4 of the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) 
Act 2003, which states that 'employment' includes: 
(a)any employment under a contract of service,
(b)any employment under a contract of apprenticeship, and
(c) any employment in the service of the Crown.  
Note that this is not, unlike others, an exclusive definition. Compare 
this with section 42(2) of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 
2000  on  provisions  relating  to  the  protection  of  children  where 
'employment' means paid employment, whether under a contract of 
service or apprenticeship or under a contract for services. So, even if 
'contract of  service'  is  generally  undefined in  modern  statutes, it 
generally appears within a definition of the concept of employment 
that is defined in a wide variety of ways.47
Atiyah was conscious of the two views examined here as to the 
meaning of 'employment', but nevertheless continued to prefer the 
unified approach. He said the purposive approach "has the merit of 
emphasising that legal concepts are tools to be used intelligently for 
the purpose in hand and not to be applied blindly to a variety of 
uses".48 However,  he  argued  that  where  the  law  does  recognise 
fundamental legal concepts it seems pointless not to use them. They 
at  least  provide  "valuable  sign  posts."49 But  this  surely  begs  the 
question. It is only if the field in question is unified that this would be 
the case. There is also the danger with this view of falling into the 
trap when dealing with concepts of allowing definitions to determine 
solutions  to  problems  instead  of  definitions  following  on  from 
purposive analysis.50
Deakin puts forward an argument that creates difficulties for 
those advocating a unified approach. He states that the prevailing 
attitude  towards  statutory  interpretation  regards  reasoning  by 
analogy from one statutory context to another as illegitimate, and he 
gives examples of this.51 If that were true it would be a significant 
47 For other recent examples, see Criminal Justice Act 2003, Sch. 3 Part 2; Enterprise 
Act 2002, ss. 128 and 234; Social Security Fraud Act 2001, s.15; Health and Social 
Care Act 2001, Sch. 1 Pt. 3; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, s.59; Transport 




50 As  H.L.A. Hart famously wrote: "though theory is to be welcomed, the growth of 
theory  on  the  back  of  definition  is  not."  (See  Hart,  'Definition  and  Theory  in 
Jurisprudence' in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1983) 21 at p.25.
51 Deakin, 'The Changing Concept of the "Employer" in Labour Law', (2001) 30 ILJ 72 
at p. 79.
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impediment. However, perhaps he overstates his case. For example, 
in the decision of the House of Lords in Carter v. Bradbeer52 in 1975 
Lord Diplock said:
The  ratio  decidendi  of  a  judgment  as  to  the  meaning  of 
particular words or combination of words used in a particular 
statutory  provision  can  have  no  more  than  a  persuasive 
influence on a court which is called on to interpret the same 
words  or  combination  of  words  appearing  in  some  other 
statutory provision."53
So it is clear that, although the practice is not required, it is by no 
means viewed as 'illegitimate'.54 Indeed, if the statutes are on the 
same subject matter (in pari materia) the approach of the courts is 
that the same meaning will usually be given, with exceptions being 
made in cases, for example, where a prior interpretation is obviously 
erroneous, as in the Court of Appeal's decision in Royal Crown Derby 
Porcelain  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Raymond  Russell.55 Cross  states  that  what 
amounts  to  an  'obligation'  exists  on  the  judge to  consider  other 
statutes in pari materia.56 Even in cases where statutes are not in pari 
materia  Cross  shows that  reasoning  by  analogy  is  by  no  means 
illegitimate. He states:
In  a  statutory area,  reasoning  by  analogy  within  the 
statutory 'code' is  perfectly acceptable by application of the 
general rule permitting the use of other statutes on the same 
subject as a guide to interpretation.57
A good example of this is R v. Arthur58 in 1968 when the words 'any 
person' in section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 
were given the same meaning, contrary to the initial inclination of the 
court, as those same words in section 2 of the Malicious Damage Act 
1861.59
 As Lord Diplock pointed out in  Carter60 the undoubted move 
towards a greater degree of purposive interpretation by the courts61 
52 [1975] 3 All ER 158.
53 At p. 161.
54 See  further,  Manchester,  Salter,  Moodie  and  Lynch,  Exploring  the  Law:  The 
Dynamics of Precedent and Statutory Interpretation  (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
2nd edn 2000) at p.49.
55 [1949] 2 KB 417.
56 Cross,  Statutory Interpretation  (Butterworths, London, 3rd edn 1995 by Bell and 
Engle) at p. 151-2. This contains a useful analysis of the circumstances in which 
statutes will be considered to be in pari materia - see p.150f.
57 Ibid., p. 44. See further Pioneer Aggregates (UK) Ltd v. Secretary of State for the 
Environment [1984] 2 All ER 358.
58 [1968] 1 QB 810.
59 See  further  Bankowski  and  MacCormick  in  MacCormick  and  Summers  (eds) 
Interpreting Statutes (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1991) at p. 369.
60 Supra n. 52, at p.161.
61 Of course, there is nothing new in purposive approaches in interpreting statutes 
which goes back at least as far as 1584 - see Heydon's Case 3 Co. Rep. Fa; 76 ER 
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will mean that similar words in different statutes will result only in a 
persuasive  argument  at  most  that  they  should  be  interpreted 
similarly.  Different  contexts  will  mean  the  potential  at  least  for 
identical words to be given different interpretations. However, it is not 
always  necessary  in  the  context  of  a  purposive approach for  the 
interpretations to be different in that such an approach recognises 
that even identical concepts may be treated differently in different 
contexts. It is not dependent on varied definitions but on a varied 
application in different situations.
Deakin states, however, that the reluctance of the courts to 
reason by way of analogy from statute to the common law is now 
decreasing,  and  that  is  facilitative  of  a  unified  analysis  of 
employment.62 It is certainly true that there has not been a unified 
approach with  the  regard  to  the  conceptual relationship  between 
statute and the common law historically.  Statute tends to provide 
additional, alternative, remedies and conceptual frameworks to the 
common  law.  It  does  not,  on  the  whole,  attempt to  amend the 
common law. Even on those occasions when it strays into common 
law territory, it does so very tentatively. So, for example, the Equal 
Pay Act 1970 seeks to remedy the deficiencies of the common law 
that does not require equal treatment between the sexes in the terms 
and conditions of employment. It does so by stating that, where a 
contract does not already contain one, an equality clause shall  be 
deemed to be included.63 And yet the remedy is not in contract at all 
but  is  a  stand-alone  statutory  claim  under  the  Act  with  the 
consequence that, for example, normal contract limitation periods do 
not apply. Also, the case was brought in an industrial tribunal even 
when it did not have jurisdiction to hear contract claims.64
However,  I  have  argued  elsewhere  that  there  are  many 
examples where the courts, in interpreting employment legislation, 
have found it difficult to abandon their common law roots and have 
injected common law ideas into statutory claims.65 I referred to what I 
considered to be a particularly striking illustration of this in the case 
of  Western  Excavating  (ECC)  Ltd.  v.  Sharp.66 This  was  a  case 
concerning the definition of 'constructive dismissal' in section 95(1)(c) 
of  the Employment Rights Act for  the purposes of claiming unfair 
dismissal. Deakin  was later to use the same case in  point.67 This 
637.638.  See Miers and Page  Legislation  (Sweet and Maxwell,  London,  2nd edn. 
1990) p. 170f.
62 See particularly Deakin, 'Private Law, Economic Rationality and the Regulatory 
State' in The Classification of Obligations (ed. Birks, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) 
p. 283.
63 Equal Pay Act 1970, section 1(1).
64 This has now changed by virtue of the Employment Tribunals (Extension of 
Jurisdiction) (England and Wales) Order 1994 (SI 1994/1623) and the Employment 
Tribunals (Extension of Jurisdiction) (Scotland) Order 1994 (SI 1994/1624).
65 See Honeyball, 'Employment Law and the Primacy of Contract', (1989) 18 ILJ 97.
66 [1978] IRLR 27. 
67 See 'Private Law, Economic Rationality and the Regulatory State' in The 
Classification of Obligations (ed. Birks, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) 283 at p.297.
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states that the employee will be taken to have been dismissed if he 
resigns in circumstances such that he is entitled to do so by reason of 
the employer's conduct. Entitlement here was originally thought to 
arise where the employer had acted unreasonably - this is, after all, in 
the context of a statutory claim that seeks to provide remedies where 
the common law does not for the unfairness of a dismissal. However, 
the Court of Appeal held that this was not correct. The test to apply 
was whether the employer had committed a repudiatory breach of 
contract. The common law had crept in through the back door. 
However,  perhaps this  is  after  all  not  so  striking  as  it  first 
appears, for several reasons. First, the scheme of the unfair dismissal 
claim is such that the issue of reasonableness has its part to play in 
that stage of the proceedings where the fairness or unfairness of the 
dismissal is examined. To introduce the concept of reasonableness at 
the  earlier  point  when  determining  whether  there  has  been  a 
dismissal at all may make the later issue redundant and at best may 
cause confusion. Secondly, the legislation is not so divorced from the 
common law as it might appear. For example, the unfair dismissal 
remedy does not apply where an employee is dismissed from his or 
her  employment,  but  upon  the  termination  of  a  contract  of 
employment,  and  one  employment  may  consist  of  a  number  of 
contractual  periods.  Furthermore,  it  should  be  remembered, 
employment under  the  legislation  is  still  defined in  terms  of  the 
existence of contractual relationships.
Conclusion
The picture is thus a confusing one. Whilst the unified approach does 
seem to be the one favoured by the judiciary and the legislature, 
consistency is lacking. Furthermore, whether the unified or multiple 
approach is adopted, it is not clear that this is as a result of a fully-
reasoned working out of the considerations involved, or whether it is 
a consequence of more fortuitous factors. Neither is it certain that it 
is the approach that should be adopted.
Although there are clear difficulties associated with the unified 
approach, as we have seen, to move to a multiple approach, perhaps 
policy-focussed, would  in  any  event  not  be straightforward.  There 
would be a price that it might not be possible or desirable to pay. To 
take just one example a multiple approach would probably best be 
served  by  an  attendant  change  in  nomenclature,  particularly  in 
legislation,  in  order to make clear that different concepts were in 
point. It would seem that much of the confusion has arisen in this 
area because, if different concepts are in issue, the same term has 
been used to apply to them. If different terms were to be adopted this 
result would largely be avoided. But the consequence of that in turn 
would be that the law would appear more technical to those to whom 
it applies, and more divorced from reality. Relative familiarity for the 
lay person with 'employment', 'contracts of employment', 'contracts 
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of service' and so on mean that the law is more accessible than it 
would be were neologisms to abound, as would probably be required. 
Neither, purely on a practical and political level, is such a change 
likely to be brought about. We can discard it as a serious possibility.
However, there is one improvement that could be made which, 
though modest and limited in scope, would I suggest be a move in 
the  right  direction.  Matters  are  made  unnecessarily  confused  at 
present because the limited terminology that is used is employed in a 
definitionally cross-referencing manner that is unhelpful. To define an 
employee as one who works under a contract of employment, for 
example,  is  not  only  generally  unenlightening  but  opens  up  the 
definitional approaches that have been adopted in other areas with 
regard to those phrases.68 Be it good or bad, this invites a unified 
approach. On the other hand, if an approach were to be adopted that 
sought to identify the concept without reference to other concepts in 
law, this would, I suggest, be both more enlightening and less of a 
temptation  to  stray  into  areas  that  have  not  been  fully  worked 
through. Definitions of the type that define an employee as one who 
undertakes  to  perform  work  for  another  personally  would  be  an 
example, and already exist in some areas.69 But this would merely be 
a  beginning.  What  is  fundamentally  required  is  a  thorough 
understanding  of  the  theoretical  complexities  involved  in  the 
definition  of  concepts  which  is  not  substantially  evident  at  the 
moment. 
68 As with the heavy case law on section 230(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.
69 See e.g. part of the definition in section 82(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
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